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Abstract
The purpose of this thesis was to take an in-depth look at the arguments made by scholars against
religious nationalism. These scholars believe that the added influence of religion in nationalism
makes it take a turn for the worse. To determine whether this is truly the case, a set of the main
arguments put forth by these scholars was discussed and critiqued. The goal was to understand
whether the negative consequences of religious nationalism existing in the public sphere are a
product of religion or if they can be traced back to nationalism itself. The thesis discovers that
the main arguments being looked at bring up issues one can link to nationalism regardless of the
form it takes (religious, secular, ethnic etc.). To support the analysis, case studies from different
parts of the world were used as empirical evidence. These case studies range from the Holocaust
and the Rwandan genocide to the assassinations of prominent Egyptian and Indian politicians at
the hands of nationalist groups. The general analysis is followed by a deeper look into the
evolution of nationalism within Pakistan to understand how nationalism within the same region
and society can have both positive and negative effects. The analysis indicates that those who
find religious nationalism to be less ideal than secular nationalism fail to see that the vices within
religious nationalism are a direct result of nationalism itself, not religion.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Religious nationalism, especially in today’s day and age, is generally considered detrimental for
society. It has been deemed a perverted form of secular nationalism in most mainstream literary
works by scholars who study political science and theory with the general belief being that the
added influence of religion in nationalism makes it take a turn for the worse. In this thesis, I will
look at the role played by religious nationalism in different societies, the main arguments and
critiques against religious nationalism and a specific case study, pre-1947 British India and post1947 Pakistan, to take a deeper look at how religious nationalism can have positive and negative
effects in the same region and society.

Religious nationalism is on the rise around the globe. In some cases, its rise is very explicit—for
example, in India’s case with the Hindutva movement (Malji 2020). In other cases, the
involvement of religious nationalist elements may not be as explicit. A prominent example of
this is the involvement of Christian nationalism in the recent anti-immigration wave in the
United States (Al-Kire et al. 2021).

While the ways that religious nationalism influences a country or society may differ, there have
been quite a few prominent cases where religious nationalism has given rise to (or led to an
increase in) communal violence. A recent example of this is the case of radical Buddhist
nationalism in Myanmar that has resulted in the deaths of thousands of Rohingya Muslims, with
many of them fleeing to neighboring Bangladesh to avoid being persecuted (International Crisis
Group 2017). As nations and states around the world are growing increasingly polarized, these
waves of religious nationalism do not appear to be subsiding anytime soon. In a world where the
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largest democracy, India (UNDEF 2021), and the country with the strongest economy, the
United States, are experiencing an uptick in religious nationalism, it is imperative to better
understand religious nationalism and whether or not it is truly detrimental to society.

To that end, I shall argue that, although on the surface level it appears that the ‘religious’ element
of religious nationalism leads to conflict, violence and societal collapse, religion is not the sole,
or perhaps even the primary, factor that leads to these outcomes. The problems that arise in
societies where elements of religious nationalism are present come about as a byproduct of
nationalism itself, not religious nationalism specifically. Nationalism, whether religious or
secular, is a source of inherent instability and is bound to lead to complications of one kind or
another if left unchecked.

To build on this line of argument, I will look at the main points put forth by scholars who believe
that religion, specifically, is responsible for the vices brought about as a result of religious
nationalism. I will tackle these points from a theoretical perspective and then through the use of
real-world examples where it is evident that it was the internal logic of nationalism itself that led
to the societal collapse, violence, and conflict that can be seen in the examples. The examples
will span cases of both secular nationalism and religious nationalism, so I have sufficient
evidence to make my argument.

I begin in Section 2 by defining the key terms that will be used in this thesis. Doing so will
ensure that there is a general, base level understanding of the meanings of complex terms such as
nationalism, nation, and state. It is important to do so as these terms have been used in different
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contexts throughout history and, depending on the context, they can have different meanings—I
want to make sure that the meaning I wish to convey and the way in which I view these terms is
explicit. Following this, Section 3 will look at the arguments made against religious nationalism
by scholars who have studied the phenomenon. Here, after presenting the main arguments put
forth by said scholars, I will offer counter arguments to assess the validity of these claims. In
essence, Section 3 will deal with understanding whether the religious element of religious
nationalism is truly to be blamed for the negative effects religious nationalism has had on
society.

Following this, in Section 4, I will look at the role played by religious nationalism in British
India and post-1947 Pakistan. Looking at this in-depth case study will allow us to better
understand how religious nationalism can evolve in a region over time and how it can have both
positive and negative consequences.
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II. DEFINING KEY TERMS

In this section, I am going to look at the meaning of nationalism itself and assess how it has been
viewed and described over time. The end result will be a working definition for the term
‘nationalism,’ and, in the process, I will look at the definition for the term ‘nation’. I will shed
some light on why I decided to use one specific definition, as opposed to something else, and
why it fits well with the overall argument I am trying to make. An important point to keep in
mind in the process is that nationalism is, at its very core, a word. This statement sounds
simplistic on its own, but it is important to recognize this fact, as nationalism is not a
phenomenon that can be defined through empirical means. Nationalism is not something that can
be observed in the natural world, thus making our task a definitional one, not an empirical one.

As a result of it being a definitional task, it is natural to see the word being defined in myriad
ways with most, if not all, of the definitions varying based on the context in which they are used
(Motyl 1992, 308). Giovani Sartori, a renowned political scientist, recommends that the best
approach one can take is to look at these different definitions and to isolate the core, fundamental
concepts underlying each one of them (Motyl 1992, 307). By following this approach, I can tease
out the base definition of the concept itself and to ignore the context-dependent variations that
have been introduced along the way. Then, I can determine what definition works best in the
context of this thesis.
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A. Nation and State
The concept of nationalism cannot exist without the idea of a nation so let us focus on nations
first1. The idea of a nation as it is loosely understood today is very recent. Nations are considered
to be groups of people that share the same heritage, culture, myths, language and in some cases,
religion. This list is by no means exhaustive, but the general belief is that the word ‘nation’ refers
to a group of people that is united by some common factor and the desire to control a territory
that is thought of as the group's national homeland (Barrington 1997, 712-713). This common
factor (or these common factors) can vary from one nation to another depending on what beliefs
and traits they value more than others.

A state, on the other hand, refers to the political and territorial structures that house a population.
This includes having a sovereign government to govern the populace within specific borders that
are, at least in modern times, internationally recognized (PSU Geography of International Affairs
2021). Combining these two ideas gives rise to the idea of a ‘nation-state’, a sovereign state that
is governed for the sake of a single, homogenous nation.

1

The chicken and egg paradox of what came first also exists in this domain as there seems to be
some degree of conflict amongst political scientists when it comes to determining whether
nationalism stems from nations or whether nationalism gives rise to the idea of nations. Gellner
argues for the latter where he states that nationalism engenders nations (Gellner 55). He
recognizes that nationalism relies on pre-existing notions of cultural wealth, amongst other
things, but he argues that these ideas alone do not have the ability to give rise to a nation.
Nationalism weaponizes and radicalizes these ideas of cultural wealth and other phenomena that
connect people, especially through shared heritage. It has the ability to revive dead languages,
invent traditions and create ‘pristine purities’ (Gellner 56)—it gives rise to nations. Others argue
for the former, that nations have to exist for nationalism to flourish. One individual in this group,
Mellor, states that nationalism is simply a political expression of a nation’s aspirations (Mellor
1989). He believes that nations predate nationalism and that “every nation has its nationalism”
and not the other way around (Mellor 1989, 6).
7

Keeping these definitions in mind, the ancient empires and kingdoms of Egypt, China, Persia,
and Rome, amongst many others, do not meet today’s definition of what is considered a nation or
a nation-state. Some of these were simply “flocks led by a Son of the Sun or a Sun of Heaven”
(Renan 1996) who cannot be considered citizens of a state nor did they lay claim to any
territories as their historical homelands. The examples that do not fall into these cases share
similarities with others: clans and collections of clans with no central, sovereign institutions and
no historical, shared territory that they controlled or wished to control. Others constituted
societies with feudal structures or empires that spanned such a large area that it would be
impossible to consider them as singular nations or nation-states. At one point in time, Alexander
the Great’s empire covered swathes of land from Western Europe all the way to Central Asia, yet
there are no nations today that derive their sense of national identity from his empire (Renan
1996).

For this thesis, however, looking at the modern-day ideas of nations should suffice. The timeline
being studied does not stretch too far into the past, so the origins of nations is not a concern..
Some of the main attributes of modern day nationhood as described by Rasmussen (2001) are:
(1) a common postulated relationship which can either be a blood relationship or, and this is the
case more commonly, a relationship derived through a shared myth 2, (2) a shared cultural
heritage, (3) linguistic coherence which can include one distinct language or multiple interlinked
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Here, the word myth does not refer to a story known to be false. Instead, it refers to a story or
set of stories that the members of a nation believe to be a part of their origin, of their collective
identity
8

languages where distinctness (when compared to other languages) is considered to have a great
impact on the strength of national identity, (4) a sense of identification by the members of the
nation to the nation they belong to. This list, as highlighted by Rasmussen as well, is not an
exhaustive list, and a single nation is not expected to reflect all of these simultaneously to be
considered a nation (Rasmussen 2001).

In conjunction with what has been discussed so far, Smith’s definition of a nation can be used as
the working definition for this thesis because it essentially conveys Rasmussen’s main points in a
more concise manner3. Smith defines a nation as “a named human population sharing an historic
territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy
and common legal rights and duties for all members” (Smith 1991, 14). While it can be argued
that some of these points, such as the presence of common myths, come about as a result of a
nation existing in the first place, the definition works well for this thesis.

3

Rasmussen does not add territory to this list as he believes that a group of people can be
considered a nation without having its own distinct territory. His discussion on states and the
combined idea of a nation-state includes territory as a focal component as that is when it
becomes essential to do so. While Rasmussen’s definition is more detailed, Smith’s idea of a
nation includes territorial claims as well. Therefore, I believe it is important to refer to both when
thinking about what the word ‘nation’ means.
9

B. Nationalism
Now that we have a working definition for a ‘nation’, I can move on to defining nationalism.
There are two common approaches to defining nationalism. The first approach considers
nationalism to be an idea or a belief while the second one considers nationalism to be a process.
Of the most prominent scholars in the first category, Ernst Haas, an expert on international
relations theory, has perhaps the most basic and straightforward way of defining nationalism. He
calls it “a belief held by a group of people that they ought to constitute a nation, or that they
already are one” (Barrington 1997, 713). This way of thinking about nationalism is very common
amongst people who have worked on the subject and the definitions put forth by Gellner, Motyl
and Haas are considered standard ways of defining nationalism 4.

The second category of people are those who define nationalism as a process rather than an idea.
The scholars in this category look at features that define a nation, and they consider nationalism
as the process through which these features are united to ultimately form a nation. Roy Mellor,
who considers nationalism to be “the political expression of the nation’s aspirations” (Mellor
1989, 5), is a prominent voice in this second category. The one aspect of nationalism most of
these political scientists and theorists believe to be essential is that there is some claim to
territory that is involved in their understanding of nationalism. Those in the first category believe
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Another widely accepted definition is that one proposed by Rejai and Enloe who define
nationalism as “an awareness of membership in a nation (potential or actual), together with a
desire to achieve, maintain, and perpetuate the identity, integrity, and prosperity of that nation”
(Rejai). This definition puts Rejai and Enloe in the group of people that consider nationalism to
be an idea or a belief.
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that nationalism as an idea is tied to common territorial descent to some degree or that it can be
linked to a group of people that share common territory while those in the second category
consider nationalism to be a process whereby a group of people can lay claim to a territory as
theirs.

Synthesizing the definitions of nationalism put forth by different scholars, across both categories,
and focusing solely on the fundamental, underlying arguments, there are two key features of
nationalism that appear especially prominent (Barrington 1997). The first one is that almost all
nationalisms define a set of territorial boundaries (which do not have to be very precise) that a
nation should have the right to control. The second one focuses on the boundaries for the nation
itself i.e., the criteria that an individual needs to fulfil to be considered a member of the nation.
The second feature is where Smith and Rasmussen’s definitions of a nation, which was examined
earlier in this section, come into play. These two features are both important when looking at
modern day nationalisms such as Indian nationalism, ethnic nationalism in Rwanda and religious
nationalism in Israel, amongst others. All involve (to some degree) a claim to territory.
Moreover, those within said territory should conform to the image of a person who belongs to
that nation. This will be discussed in detail in the next section when the examples will be
explored in detail.

I believe that Jonathan Hearn, a sociologist, has defined nationalism in a way that applies
perfectly as a working definition in the context of this thesis. In his book, Rethinking
Nationalism, Hearn writes that nationalism is “the making of combined claims, on behalf of a
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population, to identity, to jurisdiction and to territory” (Hearn 2006, 11). This definition
succinctly combines both the key features I have highlighted earlier while not including any
context dependent stipulations that do not apply in modern day nationalisms.

C. Religious Nationalism
With this understanding of the meaning of the words ‘nation’ and ‘nationalism’, I can move on
to defining the phrase ‘religious nationalism’. Before arriving at a general understanding of what
religious nationalism is, it is important to understand what it is not. The general assumption in
today’s day and age is that nationalism is a secular phenomenon, that it relates to and interacts
with nations in a purely secular, nonreligious way. The reason why this is so has to do with our
understanding of nations and nationalism. Looking back to the operational definitions of both of
these, it is clear that there is no explicit mention of religion apart from one case: where common
religion can contribute to a group of people considering themselves a nation. Even in this case,
however, other factors such as shared heritage, culture, language etc. need to come into play to
strengthen that feeling of nationhood. Perhaps the only modern-day exceptions to this statement
are the states of Pakistan and Israel, both of which are considered ‘ideological states’ (Devji
2013, 4) formed on the basis of religion itself.

Nationalism in the case of every other state, as a result, is considered to be nonreligious by
default. Therefore, when religion is mixed with nationalism to give rise to religious nationalism,
the end result is considered a perversion of nationalism. This idea of religion perverting
nationalism stems from the belief that religion is something that is personal and should remain
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out of the public sphere. Following the shift toward the separation of church and state in the
second half of the second millennium, spearheaded by Enlightenment thinkers and
constitutionalized by the United States (Boisi Center for Religion and American Public Life
2007), this belief has simply grown stronger. So, when religion, something which should be kept
private, starts playing an active role in nationalism, which exists in the public sphere, it leads
people to draw the conclusion that the end results will not be good for society. They believe that
religious nationalism can lead to dangerous outcomes as a result of the infusion of ‘otherworldly’
significance and beliefs that cannot be explained or supported through factual debates (Omer and
Springs 2013, 1). One implicit assumption that lies within this line of reasoning is that
nationalism is a modern and progressive concept while religion is something of the past, relying
on beliefs that are ignorant of the progress humanity has made in the past few centuries. This
leads to the conclusion that any degree of religion in nationalism will simply alter the latter for
the worse.

I do not agree with this line of reasoning as it is overly simplistic. Boiling down two complex
institutions like religion and nationalism into such simple categories leads to an incorrect view of
religious nationalism as a combined institution. However, this argument is one that is supported
by quite a few political scientists and theorists, so I would be doing an injustice to that school of
thought if I chose to completely ignore their arguments. At the forefront of this modernist view
of religious nationalism is Mark Juergensmeyer. Juergensmeyer (1994) , like many others,
believes that religious nationalism and secular nationalism are entirely different; that they are
polar opposites of one another. He states that these institutions encompass “competing
ideologies” (Juergensmeyer 1994, 26-44) with secular nationalism being the preferred option
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over religious nationalism in every case. The latter, he believes, leads to divisions within society.
I will look at Juergensmeyer’s comments and arguments in detail in the next section where they
will become more relevant.

Based on what I have described so far, it is evident that there is no single way to define religious
nationalism and that like nationalism, this definition is rooted in context. For the purpose of this
thesis, I am more interested in defining religious nationalism in comparison with secular
nationalism as British India saw a rise in secular nationalist sentiments first, which were then
infused with religious divisions to give rise to religious nationalist movements. Brubaker, in an
extensive study on the matter, concludes that there are essentially four ways to look at the
relationship between religious nationalism and secular nationalism (Brubaker 2011, 2-12). These
are:
1. Religion and nationalism as analogous phenomena
2. Religion as a cause or explanation of nationalism
3. Religion as intertwined with nationalism
4. Religious nationalism as a distinctive kind of nationalism

I have already looked at case (4) by elaborating on the research carried out by Juergensmeyer
and (3) by discussing the existence of a symbiotic relationship between religious and secular
nationalism as described by Hibbard. One of the main arguments put forth in support of case (2)
is that religion can serve as one of the unifying factors for bringing a nation together and
ultimately giving rise to nationalism. In this case, nationalism is still considered secular, and
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religion is one of the components needed to form a nation, nothing more. I will briefly discuss
the last case to ensure a holistic understanding of the subject before moving on.

Nationalisms that define themselves as being secular or explicitly nonreligious, Max Weber
argues, still have some elements of religion present within them. Weber states that secular
nationalism still uses cultural, religious, and ethnic resources to help build the sense of being a
part of a nation and to cement a group identity (Omer and Springs 2013, 44). In Essays on
Nationalism, Hayes makes the argument that secular nationalism can be thought of as a religion
in and of itself. He explores the determination that a group of people might have and the source
of strength that motivates them to “subordinate all other human loyalties to national loyalty”
(Hayes 1933, 94).

What gives rise to a group of individuals’ tendency to come together on the basis of something
they collectively believe in has been a topic of discussion for generations. Humans, since the
dawn of time, have been distinguished from other life forms as they have the ability to have a
“religious sense” (Hayes 1933, 95) that transcends the physical world. This argument is very
similar to the concepts of ‘profane self vs sacred self’ put forth by Emile Durkheim, a sociologist
whose work has influenced most, if not all, authors I have brought up so far. “A man cannot
enter into intimate relations with sacred things until he has rid himself of all that is profane”
(Giddens and Durkheim 1972, 233). There are parallels between this and Hayes' argument, with
the sacred entity being national loyalty and the profane entity being other loyalties that one has.
This is very similar to how most mainstream religions function where one is expected to put
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religion and, in the case of monotheistic faiths, a supreme deity, above all else. Anthony Smith,
Brubaker suggests, holds the same belief; for Smith, nationalism is “a religion both in a
substantive sense, in so far as it entails a quest for a kind of this-worldly collective ‘salvation’,
and in a functional sense, in so far as it involves a ‘system of beliefs and practices that
distinguishes the sacred from the profane and unites its adherents in a single moral community of
the faithful’” (Brubaker 2011, 3).

At a very basic level, as can be deciphered from Smith’s discussion of the subject, there are two
main points put forth by those who believe that nationalism can be considered a form of religion:
(1) both demand utmost loyalty towards one entity and (2) both have a system of beliefs and
symbols that connect and bring their followers together. Therefore, it is important to understand
that nationalism itself, in most cases, has quasi-religious qualities which is why the argument that
religious nationalism is a perverted form of secular nationalism does not make logical sense.
Moreover, the negative aspects commonly attributed to religious nationalism can also be
connected to the quasi-religious qualities of nationalism itself—an arena I will explore further in
the next section.

Out of the four highlighted cases above, it is now important to decide which case makes the most
sense for the purpose of this thesis. I have already alluded to this earlier but case 3 (Religion as
intertwined with nationalism), is perhaps the one case that is most prominent in the context of
post-independence Pakistan while case 4 (Religious nationalism as a distinctive kind of
nationalism) will help explain some of the earlier developments of Islamic nationalism towards
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the start of the 20th century. Prior to the split that occurred along religious lines after the
formation of the All-India Muslim League in 1906, Indian nationalism was one collective
institution. The Indian people’s national and religious interests were being jointly represented. In
this context, the form of nationalism that was prevalent would fall under the umbrella of case 1
(Religion and nationalism as analogous phenomena). Therefore, even within the example of
Indian nationalism extending from British India to modern day Pakistan, India and Bangladesh,
the nationalisms involved are multi-faceted. In conclusion, there is a high degree of nuance
involved in analyzing religious nationalism, so simply labeling it as a perverted or distorted form
of secular nationalism would be unjust.
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III. CRITIQUING ARGUMENTS AGAINST RELIGIOUS NATIONALISM

After looking at the definitions for some key terms that I will be using in this thesis, the next step
is to shift the focus towards religious nationalism and how it has been viewed over time by
different scholars and researchers. To better understand the rift between secular and religious
nationalism, I will expand on the arguments put forth by scholars on the subject of religious
nationalism and why they think it is a perversion of secular nationalism or otherwise undesirable.

Religion, in this school of thought, is considered a thing of the past; an institution that has no
place in modern times. Most writers on the subject, such as Rupert Emerson, are of the view that
secular nationalism should replace the hold that religion has had on societies around the world
(Juergensmeyer 1994; Emerson 1960, 158; Acquaviva 1979, 83). When writing his book, From
Empire to Nation, Emerson (1960) held that secular nationalism would leave its Western
confines and take over the whole world. He acknowledged that the wave of secular nationalism
in the West happened in conjunction with a downfall of religion.

This rise in secular nationalism and a subsequent decline in the hold of religious institutions was,
and still is, considered the West’s gift to the rest of the world as it was seen as a shift away from
the arcane ways of religion and towards modernity (Juergensmeyer 1994, 14). In framing it as
such, and keeping in mind that this point of view is one that is a very popular one, it is evident
how religion has been demonized and reduced to simply being an institution of that past that
enlightened humans do not, and should not, believe in.
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Karl Marx famously said that “religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of a
heartless world and the soul of soulless conditions. It is the opium of the people” (Marx 1844).
He believed that it offered people a way to come to terms with their daily oppression. Freud
compared religion to a “childhood neurosis” (Freud 1927). Acceptance of secularization became
so widespread that “the consensus was such that not only did the theory [remain] uncontested but
apparently it was not even necessary to test it, since everybody took it for granted” (Casanova
1994, 17).

The opposition to religious nationalism, it appears, is not solely directed towards nationalism that
draws its sense of nationhood from religious roots. In fact, the opposition starts from religion
itself. Most scholars who write about religious nationalism, especially those who consider it to be
evil or detrimental to society, believe that religion itself is an institution that is old and arcane—
an institution that should not exist in the modern world. Their reasoning is generally motivated
by the post Enlightenment way of viewing religion.

Similarly, Freud believed that there were similarities between believing in religion and having
childhood neurosis (Barker 2014, 3), and many other Enlightenment thinkers would agree with
Marx and Freud. This same belief is already held very strongly in scholarly circles in the West,
as a result of the Enlightenment, that paved the way for the separation of the church and state
(Friedland 2001, 126). When it comes to the study of religious nationalism, most literature seems
to amplify this belief. More recently, this view has seeped through to the East, especially in
states that gained independence in the 20th century. An example of such influence is that of
Jawaharlal Nehru, the first Prime Minister of India, who famously said “there is no going back”
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(Juergensmeyer 1994, 12) to segregating and differentiating based on religious beliefs; he stated
that modernity and secularism were the only ways for India to move forward.

In this section, I will look at some of the main lines of argument put forth by those who believe
that religious nationalism does not lead to any positive outcomes for society or that it leads to
episodes of violence in more extreme cases. In each of the following subsections, I will first
discuss the four main themes that appear in writings by critics of religious nationalism, and then
I will provide counter arguments against them.

A. Argument 1
Religious nationalists, particularly those in the East, have not ‘modernized’ enough to
understand that a rational compact between people can be enough to unify them around a
shared sense of identity

Perhaps the most salient point of argument that is made against religious nationalism, and nationstates around the globe which are influenced by religion, is this idea that religion’s active
presence in the public sphere is a relic of the past. From the early 1600s onwards, societies in
Europe started experiencing a shift in how they governed themselves. The church started losing
power, and a secular, national culture started becoming the underlying, unifying factor that
brought together a nation (Rieffer 2003, 231-232). This process of separation of church and state
did not happen overnight; it happened gradually over the course of a few centuries. It is heralded

20

as a great step towards modernization, especially by Enlightenment thinkers who believed the
separation to be an “essential condition for freedom” (Friedland 2001, 126).

Religion was blamed for giving the state a certain degree of absolutism in its rule which then led
to acts of violence. Once relegated to the private sphere, it appears that they believed religion
would not have the same degree of control over the people and, as a result, there would be less
acts of violence. This process of Enlightenment, of the shift from nations being defined on the
basis of religion to something more secular, did not carry over to the East, however.

The presence of religion in the public sphere is one of the main reasons why the adoption of
secular nationalism has not been as successful in the East. Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, a Palestinian
leader, asserts that politics should not exist independently of religion and any argument
otherwise i.e. that religion should not influence politics, is a Western concept that does not apply
to nation states in the East (Juergensmeyer 1994, 6). Proponents of religious nationalism,
Juergensmeyer (1994) notes, believe that the foundation of a nation cannot be formed only on the
basis of politics and secular culture; this void needs to be filled simultaneously with a political
and religious approach, with the latter informing the former. Religious nationalists reject the idea
that a nation’s political order can be based on a rational compact that aims to bring people who
live in close geographical proximity together through a set of laws and secular politics.

Scholars who criticize religious nationalism, when making the case against the presence of
religion as a unifying force for a nation, relegate religious nationalism to a perverted form of
secular nationalism. They believe that religious nationalism leads to “disruption of order and loss
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of life… and, at times, even massacres associated with religious persecution” (Armstrong 1997,
598). These massacres include, but are not limited to, Western Europe labeling Eastern
Christians as heretics and killing them, the massacre of the Jews, and the conflicts between
Christians and Muslims that have lasted centuries (Armstrong 1997, 599).

Enlightenment thinkers, in line with modern day scholars who oppose religious nationalism,
believed that a secular worldview along with understanding the world through rational
explanations (Rieffer 2003, 232), instead of relying on religious superstition, would allow
humanity to progress past these evils of religion. While religious nationalisms do bring people
together, they “violate civil society’s codes” (Friedland 2001, 149); by contrast, these scholars
believe that having a rational compact that unites people would allow a nation to surpass these
negatives. In short, religious nationalism is based on a set of pre-modern beliefs that humanity
should shed in its current post-enlightenment phase.

These same scholars highlight that many cases of religious nationalism and violence induced by
religious nationalists involve some degree of retaliation against the West. This may include, at a
very basic level, disliking Western teachings and ideals, and in more extreme cases, hatred
directed towards Western states that had colonized the religious nationalists’ countries at some
point in time. The main factors that contribute to this animosity include the fact that Western
nations actively advocate that religion should exist only in the private sphere and that these
nations were once colonizers of most Eastern states.
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This leads scholars to argue that religious nationalists actively choose to either continue or revert
to letting religion influence political and social structures simply because they want to retaliate
against the West. The underlying assumption here is that if these religious nationalists were truly
rational beings and weighed the pros and cons of secularization, instead of simply retaliating
against it, they would opt to relegate religion to the private sphere.

Critique on Argument 1
The core argument here uses the Enlightenment as a foundation. Scholars mention it directly or
indirectly to support their argument that nations where religion is still present in the public
sphere are inherently backward given their lack of understanding that a rational compact between
people can be enough to unify them around a shared sense of identity. This claim stems from the
belief that religion in the public sphere brings superstition, old beliefs that do not rely on
rationality, and intolerance with it, all of which are detrimental to society.

However, some of these scholars seem to believe that religion as an institution should cease to
exist while prominent Enlightenment thinkers such as Voltaire, Kant and Hume did not
categorically state that all religion was evil and should be completely removed from all facets of
life (Byrne and Houlden 2014). The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy puts Enlightenment
religion in four categories: “deism, religion of the heart, fideism and atheism” (Bristow 2017).
Deism is believed to be the form of religion that is most closely associated with the
Enlightenment. In deism, the general belief is that the universe was created by a supreme
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intelligence. This being, however, does not interfere with our daily lives, and we are to rely on
our own reasoning as humans to shape and guide our lives rather than relying on miracles or
special revelations in the form of religious scriptures and the like (Bristow 2017).

Therefore, the notion that the Enlightenment called for the shedding of religion in general is one
that is not supported by the thinkers that gave rise to the movement itself. Even more
importantly, the hallmark of the Enlightenment was a commitment to rationality, and secular
nationalism does not appear to be any more rational than religious nationalism. Therefore, even
though the Enlightenment thinkers called for religion to be relegated to the private sphere,
scholars using this fact to argue that religious nationalism is not as desirable as secular
nationalism need to be cognizant of the fact that these same Enlightenment thinkers would not
support secular nationalism either.

It is even more important to understand the geographic origins of the Enlightenment and how
religion functioned in the regions that went through this transformative phase compared to the
regions that did not give rise to a similar breed of thinkers. Within Christianity itself, the split
between Western Catholics and Eastern Orthodox Christians gave rise to two very different
versions of the church-state relationship. The latter demanded “submission to earthly rulers”
(Veith 2019) thereby calling for a closer relationship between the church and state while the
former has often defined itself by defying the state (Tooley 2019).

As a result, even though the church was involved in politics in both regions to a great degree,
separating church and state in the West was not as monumental a task as doing so in the East.
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Moreover, by the time of the Enlightenment, a lot of the Eastern regions that were previously
under the influence of Christianity now had a different dominant religion—Islam. Islam’s view
on the church-state relationship is no secret; Muslims believe in the authority of Sharia law as the
supreme law of the land. The presence of codified principles and laws that come together to form
the basis of Sharia law leads to an even stronger intertwining of church and state, making the two
inseparable. Therefore, the separation of church and state was a lot easier to accomplish in the
West when compared to the East, and even then it is evident, through the current renewed
religious fervor and religious nationalism in the West (Barker 2014, 12), that they failed to
achieve true secularization as well.

Religion is still very much present in the public sphere in regions that gave birth to the
Enlightenment. Wuthnow (1992, 4) argues that it is always around us; we are not as good at
seeing it as we might think. However, for argument's sake, it can be assumed that Western
Europe, the birthplace of the Enlightenment, was truly able to achieve secularization. In this
scenario, there is no involvement from religious entities in politics and religion is an entirely
private matter for all individuals. If this were the case, arguments put forth by scholars against
the East, as discussed above, would have a lot more credibility. In this case, however, I see an
even more problematic line of argument. The Enlightenment galvanized the gradual separation
of church and state in a society where doing so was easy, given the relatively weaker nature of
that relationship.

Using this model of separation and stating that it be enforced in the East i.e. the East should
remove religion from the public sphere and rely on a rational compact as a unifying factor,
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without considering the fact that the nature of the church-state relationship in the East is very
different, simply propagates, to a certain degree, the same kind of thinking that led to the
colonization of regions such as Africa at the hands of the Europeans. This idea that the progress
and advancements made by Western European civilizations made them superior to more
‘backward’ societies is what led to the civilizing missions in Africa (Conklin 1997). Now it is
obvious that this notion of superiority was based on nothing but scientific racism—racism that
ran rampant not just in Western Europe but in the world’s first explicitly secular nation, the
United States, as well. The argument that secular Western nation-states and political structures
are more sound and better off than the religion-influenced nations in the East is not too different
from Nott (1851, 3) stating that the “White” race is intellectually superior to the “Red and Black”
races.

Moreover, even the West, despite having a considerable head start in the secularization process,
occasionally struggles with keeping religion in the private sphere (Barker 2014, 6-8).
Considering that the East did not go through the same process of Enlightenment and
secularization, establishing a secular nationalist identity instead of one that relies on religious
foundations is significantly harder.

The second part of the argument being looked at is concerned with the idea that religious
nationalists refuse to believe in secular models simply to retaliate against the West and its
teachings. This argument appears to be a bit simplistic in nature as it ignores the fact that most
countries in the East boast a collectivist culture that revolves around large family units and being
interdependent in society (Cohen, Wu and Miller 2016). This culture of collectivism is supported
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by religious teachings across a variety of faiths, and it stands in stark contrast to the
individualistic culture that is very common in most Western states. This individualism exists, in
part, as a result of religion not playing as public a role in the West as it does in the East.

As a result, religious nationalists argue that Western secular teachings calling for a departure
from religion can result in a more individualistic society which can prove detrimental for the
country. They are not simply retaliating against the West; they are trying to preserve their way of
life.

Moreover, this dislike of Western teachings does not stem solely from a religious perspective.
The collectivist culture in the East is not simply a direct result of religious influence (Cohen, Wu
and Miller 2016). Religion and culture, when both exist in the public sphere, have a much more
complex relationship than simply affecting each other. Therefore, the argument that the secular
teachings and forms of governance promoted by the West can lead to more individualization and
inevitably lead to the breakdown of society are backed by both, religion and culture.

The last point, i.e. religious nationalists dislike Western nations and ideals because they were
colonized by Western countries at some point in time, is very straightforward and does not merit
a long discussion. Since religious institutions, as stated earlier, were able to operate
independently to some degree under colonization, they did not assimilate or integrate themselves
into the colonial state as much as other institutions. Their hatred, therefore, is more pronounced
since they were never really a part of the colonial administration and in most cases, actively
struggled or fought against them. One might argue that the religious nationalists’ rejection of
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Western teachings is more so an act of retaliation then, rather than them truly trying to
understand what the other side is proposing and making a fair and just decision.

However, there are instances where the people actively wanted to go back to the way of life they
were used to when they were not being colonized by another nation, such as the case of
Azerbaijan (which will be expanded upon in Argument 4). The retaliation, therefore, is
understandable, and the need to want to live a life in the way they were used to, before having to
live under the oppression of a foreign colonial power, is justified. To view it simply as them
hating Western teachings and principles is an oversimplification and an injustice to them.

In conclusion, the idea that nations in the East, where religion is still influential in the public
sphere, should make an active effort to secularize themselves as was done in Western Europe
through the Enlightenment tends towards absolutism. One can make arguments in favor of
measures that would limit this religious influence, and the benefits that come with doing so, but
the way that current pro-secularization arguments are presented do not take into account the
societal, cultural, and historical differences between the West and the East. Theoretically,
secularization might lead to better outcomes for most nations but given the nature of the churchstate relationship in the East, especially in majority Muslim states, it might not be possible to do
so at this point in time.
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B. Argument 2
Religion gives those in power the authority to declare when violence is moral and justified
and when it is not

Religion, especially in the case of the Abrahamic religions of Islam and Christianity, has
frequently resorted to violence to expand its following and to solidify its stronghold amongst the
people already under its influence (Kung 2005). Drawing on the definition of religion from the
second section, it can be understood that the follower of a religion is required to completely
submit to an entity and cause that transcends humanity and the physical world in general. As
Emile Durkheim would phrase it, belief and submission in religion fulfil one’s need for the
‘sacred’ (Durkheim and Thompson 2004, 86). Therefore, any acts carried out by a follower of a
certain religion to bring more followers into the fold can be considered a part of one’s faith. In
this scenario, there is no cause greater than that of spreading the knowledge and message of the
supreme entity (or entities) of religion. This line of reasoning can be applied to both peaceful
acts and acts of violence as both are being committed for the greater good.

Sabrina Ramet (2005), in her analysis of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, notes that the Serbian
Orthodox church actively discouraged using dialogue and peaceful measures to diffuse the
situation. Instead of resolving the conflict in a peaceful manner, the church instilled within its
followers the belief that engaging in violent conflict against Muslims was a religious duty
(Ramet 2005), with the implicit assumption that not doing so would make one less religious.
Despite there being an alternate way, the church chose violence. In one of its pronouncements, it
stated “Once again, the Serbian nation is on the cross… to the malicious and aggressive
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Muslims: ‘Forgive us for killing you, but we cannot forgive you if you force us to kill you’”
(Ramet 2005, 270-271). This use of religious imagery by the church, “the Serbian nation is on
the cross” (Ramet 2005, 270-271), along with telling its followers that killing Muslims was a
sacred duty, is believed to be a common aspect of religious nationalism, according to its
opponents.

Similarly, Muhammad abd-al-Salam Faraj, leader of Tanzim al-Jihad and a radical Islamist and
theorist who played a role in the assassination of Egyptian president Anwar Sadat, described
Islam to be a religion of warfare (Juergensmeyer 1994, 60). He argued that Muslims around the
world have to commit to jihad, which, according to him, meant actual violent conflict and
nothing else. He, along with his followers, denied that the world had any allegorical meanings
and called for Muslims to take up arms to fulfil their rightful duty. In his case, the rightful duty
was removing Anwar Sadat, who had tried to take a more neutral approach in striking a balance
between the pro-religious political group on the one hand and the pro-secular political group on
the other. Despite Sadat’s best effort to appease the Muslim nationalists while also trying not to
turn Egypt into a completely Islamic state, he was assassinated by Faraj’s group (Juergensmeyer
1994, 37).

Juergensmeyer, in his analysis of the Sikh opposition to the Indian government, highlights
similar characteristics to the Serbian and Egyptian examples. In his conversations with a group
of Sikh fighters, who believe that the Sikhs should have their own nation, he noticed that they
were attached to their cause both politically and religiously. The group in question discussed that
Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale, a militant Sikh who was ‘martyred’ by the Indian government in
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1984, was their “symbol for radical opposition to the Indian government” (Juergensmeyer 1994,
91). Bhindranwale gave up his life for a cause he believed in, a cause motivated by his religious
beliefs, and his sacrifice glorified the idea of violent opposition for the sake of religious freedom.
Juergensmeyer goes on to look at other examples from South and Southeast Asian countries, the
Middle East, and Africa, to highlight similar circumstances that exist across different religions
and nations. Similarly, Armstrong (1997, 597) makes the same argument that religious leaders
glorify violence, and in doing so, they push their followers to commit violent acts with the belief
that they are doing so for a sacred cause.

Critique on argument 2
The arguments made against religious nationalism and the periods of violence to which it has led
to are based on sound, factual evidence. Religious nationalism in regions such as the Middle
East, India and Bosnia-Herzegovina has indeed led to violent episodes and, in some cases, the
persecution of religious minorities. These acts of violence are visibly carried out along religious
lines with believers of one faith attacking those of another or, as is the case with the Sikh
example, one religious group engaging in violence for self-determination and/or religious
freedom.

However, even though it is nearly impossible to make a strong case that these events were not
motivated by religious nationalism, it is important to understand whether these acts of violence
were a result of religion or nationalism. More specifically, it is necessary to decipher whether it
is the religious element within religious nationalism that motivated these events or whether it is
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the nature of nationalism itself that gives rise to violence. I argue that it is the latter. I do not
mean that all nationalism leads to violence, however, the inherent ‘othering’ that comes about as
a direct result of nationalism, regardless of whether it happens across religious, cultural or ethnic
lines (amongst others), is what leads to such episodes of violence.

More specifically, through the use of historical examples, I aim to show in what follows that
secular nationalism can give rise to episodes of violence at least as severe as those found in
polities under the sway of religious nationalism. The cause of violence, I will contend, is not then
religion but instead the inherent ‘othering’ that comes about as a direct result of nationalism,
regardless of whether it happens across religious, cultural, or ethnic lines (amongst others). Take,
for example, the Rwandan genocide, which occurred at the tail end of the 20th Century. Rwanda
has historically had three prominent ethnic groups. In order of size, they are the Hutus, the Tutsis
and the Twa. In 1932, 85% of the population were identified as Hutu, 14% as Tutsi and 1% as
Twa (United Nations 2021).

The Tutsis had historically been in positions of power and were better off than the Hutu, the
latter being the subjugated class (Human Rights Watch 1999). This was a result of the Tutsi
minority belonging to the royal class, a status quo that existed for centuries. Under the Belgian
colonization of Rwanda from 1916 to 1962, however, this disparity was given a new racial angle.
The Tutsis and Hutus were divided across rigid ethnic lines through the issuance of identification
cards that identified them as such based on physical characteristics and genealogy (Human
Rights Watch 1999). The Belgians, during their rule, further reinforced the notion that the Tutsi
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were superior to the Hutus by disproportionately awarding them positions of power within
official circles.

Naturally, this led to a deep-seated resentment towards the Tutsis by the Hutus (Ahluwalia 1997,
501-502). This resentment saw violent releases at various points around the 1961 elections,
which were marked by the departure of the Belgians and in sporadic intervals up until the 1994
genocide. Following independence, the Hutus were in control of the government, and a rebellion
by Tutsis in 1963 resulted in the death of 20,000 Rwandan Tutsis—a pattern that continued until
a bloodless military coup in 1973 (United Nations 2021). Many efforts were made to resolve the
ethnic divisions that had been laid down by the Belgians. By this point, however, half the
Rwandan Tutsi population was living in exile, and they were motivated by strong nationalist
sentiments to take back what they believed to be their rightful position as the superior ethnicity
in Rwanda.

A series of violent episodes spanning three decades culminated in what is now known as the
Rwandan genocide which led to the massacre of about 1,000,000 people including Tutsis and
moderate Hutus (who did not wish to partake in the massacre against the Tutsis) and the rape of
an estimated 100,000 to 250,000 women, all over the course of a hundred days (United Nations
2021). The Rwandan genocide is one of the most violent events in recent human history and it
was evidently motivated by ethnic nationalism. The Tutsis were led to believe they were the
superior ethnicity which resulted in the oppression of the Hutus—the same idea of “us vs. them”
that is present in almost every nationalist movement.
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Another similar example is that of the Holocaust. The Holocaust is perhaps the first example that
many think of when presented with the word genocide, given the sheer intensity of the massacre
that unfolded under Nazi Germany. While the genocide was carried out against a group of people
identified by their faith, a pattern of oppression that scholars blame religious nationalism for
instigating as well, the Holocaust was not perpetrated by individuals motivated by religion.
There is some debate as to what the main factors were that led Hitler to hate the Jews enough to
kill them, but none of them devote too much energy towards their faith, specifically. At the
forefront, it is believed that he had a deep-seated hatred for the Jewish population, not just in
Germany, but across the world. He blamed them for “all failings” (Holocaust Matters 2021). In
the German case, he blamed the Jews for Germany’s loss in the First World War, their influence
in banking and finance and their “role” in causing the Great Depression in 1929 (Holocaust
Matters 2021), amongst other reasons.

The argument that the Holocaust was motivated by religion would be baseless considering the
fact that Hitler did not think highly of religion in general and was critical of other religions as
well, especially Christianity which he considered “a religion fit only for the slaves” (Bullock
1962, 389). Therefore, it is evident that even one of the most notable genocides in recent human
history was fueled by the sense of superiority that nationalism can instill within a group of
people. Even though a large proportion of the group of people being targeted belonged to a
specific faith, religion had little to do with it.

Nor are the examples of Rwanda or the Holocaust unique. Think too of the Cambodian genocide,
the Armenian genocide, and the genocide in Bangladesh in 1971. All of these suggest that
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religion should not be blamed for the violence that erupts through religious nationalism—it is the
nature of nationalism that motivates people to engage in such acts. In all these cases, those who
were carrying out or supporting the massacres were led to believe that it was their moral duty to
do so and that it was completely justified.

C. Argument 3
Religious nationalism promotes one religion above all else and the followers of this religion
are deemed superior to those who do not follow it (Grim and Finke 2011).

This line of argument makes intuitive sense as it is evident through our discussion thus far that
religious nationalism is based on the belief that a certain religion is the true religion, and it
should guide the public and private lives of the nation’s members. The general consensus
amongst scholars is if a religious nationalist movement achieves its goals and is able to establish
its faith as the prime religion for all those who live within the geographical confines of the nation
at hand, other religions will be considered secondary or inferior. In some cases, there is also a
shift from being the oppressed religious group toward being the oppressor, as was the case with
Shia Muslims in Iraq following the overthrow of Saddam Hussein (Grim and Finke 2011, xii).
This holds true even for religions that theoretically preach equality as is the case with Sinhalese
Buddhism and its followers’ determination to establish superiority over the minority religious
groups in Sri Lanka (DeVotta 2007, 2).
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Religious nationalism is unlikely to exist without establishing one religion as the true religion
and, by extension, every other religion as inferior and false. This can be seen through the
examples of the Hindutva in India (Malji 2020), which has led to countless acts of violence
against the minority Muslims in India (Bajoria 2020), the Islamization of Zia’s Pakistan that
singled out minority religious groups (Hassan 1985, 264), the atrocities committed against the
Rohingya Muslims in Burma by the majority Buddhists (Zaman 2020, 27), and many others.
Although many of the religious scriptures and teachings for each of these religions preach
nonviolence and harmony, it appears that these teachings do not matter as much when religion is
infused with nationalism. Establishing religious superiority, most commonly through violent
means, becomes the priority.

Critique on Argument 3
Of the four lines of argument in this section, this is perhaps the easiest to counter. What all these
authors find detestable about religious nationalism is the foundation of nationalism itself.
Nationalism, as per our working definition, is the making of combined claims, on behalf of a
population, to identity, to jurisdiction, and to territory. To make these combined claims, the
population relies on something that brings it together. This something, in the case of religious
nationalism, is religion. Naturally, when this something brings a group of people together, others
will be excluded. Similar patterns of ‘othering’ exist in nearly every form of nationalism, so
nationalism itself is to blame for this, not religion.
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Forgoing the terms ‘imagined communities’ and ‘worldviews’ used by authors from whom he
draws some degree of inspiration (‘imagined communities’ by Anderson and ‘worldviews’ by
Smart), Juergensmeyer instead refers to religious and secular nationalisms as “ideologies of
order” (Juergensmeyer 1994, 31) with the explicit intention of using a phrase that has political
connotations. In his comparison, he draws on works by Gellner and Weber to make the claim
that a core feature of secular nationalism is the act of submitting to an “ordering agent”
(Juergensmeyer 1994, 32). This is not too different from religious nationalism where the
ordering agent, instead of simply being the state, is a divine or sacred entity. In both religious
and secular nationalism, one is expected to submit to the ordering agent and not doing so results
in the individual being alienated or ‘othered’.

The Rwandan example shows how a group of people belonging to one ethnicity deemed
themselves superior to the other ethnicities, much akin to how a group of people might consider
themselves to be religiously superior to followers of other faiths. Another example is that of
Pakistan and what Pandey and Samad (2007) term the “Punjabistan of Pakistan”. The Punjab
province of Pakistan is home to almost half of the population and generally has a
disproportionately higher representation in politics. Furthermore, the province is also home to the
Pakistan Army which has ruled the nation with an iron fist ever since its inception, either through
direct military rule or indirectly from behind the scenes (Ranjan 2012, 105). Even under civilian
leadership, a hostile Punjab has enough strength and control to topple a national administration—
a harsh realization that the Sindhi Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto had during her short tenure
from 1988-1990.
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This pattern of provincial superiority, coupled with the fact that Punjabi is more widely spoken
than Urdu, the national language, makes it evident that there exists a form of provincial
nationalism within Pakistan where the populous Punjab undermines those who do not come from
Punjab. This provincial superiority plays out in myriad ways, especially in terms of development
and water distribution, with Punjab getting a disproportionate share of both. This ‘othering’ of
non-Punjabis proved to be a pivotal factor in the separation, and subsequent independence, of
East Pakistan in 1971 and it continues to be one of the main factors fueling the insurgency in
Balochistan today (International Crisis Group 2007). Therefore, to argue that religious
nationalism has a concerning pattern of relegating those with religious beliefs different than
those in power to an inferior position is a critique of nationalism, not religion. This same
phenomenon can be seen across other forms of nationalism such as secular or ethnic nationalism.

D. Argument 4
Religious nationalists have a certain degree of power in the East that they do not wish to
lose—this prevents those nations from adopting a model of secular nationalism.

There is one theme that appears across multiple scholarly works when looking at religious
nationalist leaders in the East, and it is the influence they have in their respective nations. These
leaders do not wish to lose the influence that they have in their respective societies. This leads
critics to believe that Eastern nations would adopt a secular model if these religious leaders did
not have this power and influence over them. As a result, religious nationalist movements in
these regions are not simply movements calling for religious order and supremacy; they are also
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reactionary and revolutionary in nature (Fox 2004). The religious leaders feel threatened by the
ideas of secularization that are promoted by the West and actively retaliate against them.

Most of the states that fall in this category were colonized by a Western European country at
some point. While colonial states were in charge of most public institutions in their colonies,
religious institutions continued to operate independently. Following the departure of these
colonial states, these religious institutions had some of the nation’s “most effective systems of
communication” (Juergensmeyer 1995, 384) and religious leaders were often “more devoted,
efficient, and intelligent than government officials” (Juergensmeyer 1995, 384) . As a result,
intervention by religious leaders was not particularly difficult and religion could not be sidelined
or pushed into the private sphere as it had been in the West. The reins of government, the belief
that they are carrying out a sacred duty, and the basic human desire of wanting to have power in
authority makes religious nationalists reluctant to give up power. Since scenarios like this are
commonplace in the East, an overall shift towards secular nationalism and politics was, and
remains, virtually impossible.

There have been cases where leaders have pushed for religion to exit the public sphere and for
the nation-state to adopt a truly secular model of government. Juergensmeyer (1994) looks at the
example of India which was formed as a secular state in 1947. Three generations of Prime
Ministers, Jawaharlal Nehru, his daughter Indira Gandhi, and his grandson Rajiv Gandhi, all
tried to develop secular Indian nationalism that would bring the nation together irrespective of
religion or ethnicity. In doing so, however, they did have to make concessions to religious groups
at times. Despite this, the religious nationalists were too strong, and accepting all their demands
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would effectively reduce India to a religious nationalist state in all but name—something that
one can argue has already happened in modern-day India.

In return for not bending over backwards to meet the demands of religious nationalist groups or
for taking bold stances against them, Indira Gandhi was assassinated by Sikh nationalists
(Juergensmeyer 1994, 37). Rajiv Gandhi was greatly disliked for the same reason and suffered a
similar fate, albeit at the hands of Tamil nationalists for India’s role in the Sri Lankan conflict
against the Tamils—yet another movement involving elements of religious nationalism (Mitra
1991). On the other hand, there are examples of rulers using a nation’s religious beliefs to their
benefit.

As Hibbard describes it, “mainstream political elites… helped to normalize illiberal [exclusivist]
religious ideologies and brought these ideas into the political mainstream” (Hibbard 2012, 5).
This description of the relationship between those in power (politically) and how they used
religion to their benefit is one that fits almost perfectly in certain situations when looking at the
timeline of religious nationalism-inspired events that occurred in British India and postindependence Pakistan. One prominent example is that of Zia-ul-Haq. The military dictator came
into power on the back of a wave of nationalist sentiment that the serving Prime Minister
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was unable to properly lead the country (Mohammadi 2017, 1). After
deposing Bhutto, he imposed martial law in the country and stayed in power for a decade till
1988. During this time, Zia started his process of Islamization and would frequently use religion
as a political card to prove his government’s legitimacy when things started going awry
(Mohammadi 2017, 2).
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In general, religious activists want nearly complete control, and efforts to strike a balance by
secular governments are not reciprocated in kind. They are well aware, in most cases, of the
power and influence they hold, and they choose to use it to their benefit. In cases like that of
Pakistan, yet another post-colonial state, these religious nationalists have very large and strong
followings making them effectively invincible. If the government chooses to enact true secular
democracy, it is at risk of losing everything to religious fanatics. If the government instead
chooses to keep these religious nationalists at bay through undemocratic means, it does not bode
well for their reputation at the global level and even amongst liberal and secular circles within
the country itself. Therefore, while it is imperative to strike a balance between the demands of
the religious nationalists while also not letting the country descend into chaos, it is becoming
increasingly harder to do so in today’s polarized world.

Critique on Argument 4
This line of argument has a lot in common with a point made earlier—that people living in the
East have not modernized enough to understand that a rational compact between a group of
people can constitute a nation. However, the difference here is that scholars specifically point out
that religious leaders fulfill their desire to be in power by halting attempts towards secularization.
As a result, these states are unable to free themselves from the hold of religion and cannot
progress towards ‘modernization’. The underlying assumption here, similar to what was
discussed earlier, is that this Eurocentric view of modernization, built on the foundation of the
Enlightenment, is the ideal scenario to which a state should aspire. I will not spend time
discussing this as the arguments will be similar to what I have stated earlier. In short, simply
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supplanting existing political and social structures in the East with those from the West, without
taking into account the process these Western states went through to get there and the differences
between them and the Eastern states in question, is a flawed strategy.

It is imperative to understand that most mainstream religions that have mass followings today
originated either from Asia or Africa—the same regions being criticized by scholars for not
adopting secular models of governance. By virtue of being the birthplace of these religions, it is a
great undertaking for nation states in these regions to try to remove religion from the public
sphere as religious practices, symbols and heritages are deeply ingrained and intertwined in
society at every level (Agbiji and Swart 2015; Yang 2018). In the case of nations that gained
independence from colonialism, there was a great demand, a need even, to revert to their own
way of life—that is, to reject the Western, colonial influence. This element of anti-Westernism is
apparent in almost all the cases of religious nationalism in Asia and Africa in recent years—it is
not unique just to religious leaders but can be seen within the common populace as well.
Religious nationalist movements here consider secular nationalism to be a Western notion and
view it the same way they view everything else European: Western, neocolonial, and against
their values and traditions.

The second string within this argument is that the religious leaders in countries like India,
Pakistan, and Iran that want to be in power are in the wrong; they should let secular governments
take the helm. In response, it is worth noting that these religious leaders' desire for power is a
feature that is hardly unique to religious nationalism. Their reasons for wanting to be in power
rely on the belief that their religion is the true faith and that they should lead others under the
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umbrella of this faith. As is evident, these reasons are unique to religious nationalism. However,
the general belief that some element of a group’s identity is superior when compared to others is
a feature, a cornerstone even, of nationalism. Similar patterns exist with leaders of secular
nationalist movements.

This is especially true in the case of Azerbaijan where despite the population being
overwhelmingly Muslim (97%), it was a group of secular nationalist elite that first gave rise to
the Azerbaijani identity and took control of the nation-state. There, in 1918, the Azerbaijani
nationalist elite, led by M.A. Rasulzada, revolted against the Russians and declared
independence. In doing so, they established a unique Azerbaijani identity to differentiate
themselves from the general “Caucasian Muslims'' group (Ahmadoghlu 2020). The nation-state
of Azerbaijan Democratic Republic (ADR), established by Rasulzada’s group in 1918 ended two
years later when the Soviets took control again. However, almost eight decades later, when
Azerbaijan gained independence from the Soviet Union, the country chose to follow the example
of the ADR and remain secular rather than turning into a Muslim state. The Azerbaijanis wanted
to go back to the identity they believed in, the first instance of them identifying as a unique
nation (Ahmadoghlu 2020), and not be lumped together with other Caucasian Muslims or
‘Tatars’ regardless of the fact that most people from the time of the ADR were not alive
anymore, and those who were, were probably too young to remember anything.

In similar fashion, countries in the Middle East and South Asia, where the people strongly
identified with their religion and religion was closely tied to political and social structures, chose
to revert back to the ways of their people before the West colonized them. They derived their
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sense of identity from their religious beliefs, and this idea has seeped through and grown stronger
over the years.

Simply stating that religious leaders in these regions want to be in power and impede the process
of secularization ignores the fact that these leaders are only able to do so because of the support
they receive from the masses. If this was not the case and a majority of the population disagreed
with them, they would not have been able to take control so easily. Therefore, by looking at both
examples where religious leaders are able to take control post colonization and where a nation
chooses to remain secular despite an overwhelming majority of the population belonging to one
religion, it becomes clear that labelling religious leaders’ desire to be in power is a surface level
argument. Rather, it is the support they receive from their followers that allows them to rise and
remain in power.

Let's assume, for arguments’ sake, that these religious leaders do not have popular support and
are able to come into power regardless. In this case, critiquing their intentions would be justified.
Once again, I will argue that it is easy to find similar examples in any nationalist movements or
groups in general. The Rwandan example showed us a similar pattern with leaders from one
ethnic group trying to assert dominance over the other and efforts for coexistence did not
succeed at all. Leaders on either side wanted power for themselves. In the case of Nazi Germany,
the Nazis were convinced that they were superior to everyone else and wanted complete
authority. Solely blaming religious nationalism here does not make sense. The desire to be in
power and complete control is one that is commonplace within nationalist movements in general,
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irrespective of whether a certain group being in power is good or bad for the nation-state in the
short or long term.

E. Summary
In conclusion, there are four essential arguments that critics of religious nationalism propose
when making their case: First, religious nationalism is a less ideal, perverted form of secular
nationalism. Here, scholars argue that nations in the East have not modernized enough to
understand that a rational compact between people, rather than religion, is enough to unify them
around a shared sense of identity. The flaw in this argument is the assumption that secularization
is synonymous with modernization and that the same model of secularization adopted in the
West, especially in Europe, can simply be transported to the East without the latter going through
the same processes that gave rise to this secular model of politics in the first place.

Second, these scholars state that religion gives those in power the authority to declare when
violence is moral and justified and when it is not. This argument does not make much sense since
these very same critics do not highlight the same issue originating in nations with secular
nationalism. This idea of violence, of ‘othering’ a group of people based on certain defining
characteristics, is not unique to religious nationalism. It is, however, a defining characteristic of
nationalism itself whether it is secular, religious, or ethnic nationalism.

Along the same vein, the third main argument in critique of religious nationalism is that religious
nationalism promotes one religion above all else, and the followers of this religion are deemed
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superior to those who do not follow it. This, yet again, is a characteristic of nationalism itself.
Nationalism is built on a foundation of ‘othering’ and in the case of religious nationalism, the
basis of this othering is religion. Lastly, there is the argument that religious nationalist leaders in
the East have a certain degree of power that they would lose if their respective countries adopted
a secular model of politics. Therefore, they do not allow it to happen. It is important to
understand here that these leaders have overwhelming support from the people as these people,
or nations, derive their sense of identity from their religious beliefs. Therefore, even if the
argument that a handful of religious nationalists do not want their nations to become more
secular is true, the argument that they are single handedly hampering their nations’ progress
towards secularization is simply not true.
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IX. CASE STUDY: BRITISH INDIA AND PAKISTAN

In this section, I will look at the evolution of religious nationalism in the Indian subcontinent5
from its early origins in the 19th Century leading up to its independence from the British Raj in
1947. I will then focus on Pakistan and how religious nationalism has evolved there from 1947
onwards. Section 4 will essentially allow for a deeper look into the role religious nationalism has
played over time, with a very specific case study, and how it can have both positive and negative
consequences depending on the context. My focus will specifically be on the negative effects
that scholars have argued come about as a result of religious nationalism, as seen in Section 3.

As I trace the events motivated by religious nationalism and how the phenomenon itself gained a
stronghold in the region, I will frequently draw on our insights from the previous section to
assess whether at any given point in time Indian religious nationalism has shown patterns that
scholars such as Juergensmeyer would find concerning. In cases where violent acts are
committed in the name of religion, where critics of religious nationalism could use as evidence
of religious nationalism’s inferiority to secular nationalism, I will assess whether the issue lies
within the religious element of religious nationalism or whether it is a product of nationalism
itself.

This section is divided into three parts. The first part will focus on tracing events surrounding the
origins of religious nationalism, and how it split from the general Indian nationalism that served
as its foundation. Here, I will take a closer look at how religious nationalism influenced the

5

The Indian subcontinent, in this thesis, is limited to the territories occupied by modern day India, Pakistan and
Bangladesh
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movement for Pakistan as a separate nation for Indian Muslims following the departure of the
British and whether, in the process, there were any major negative consequences originating as a
result of the presence of religious nationalism in the public sphere. In the second part, I will carry
out a similar analysis on Pakistani religious nationalism post-1947, how it has evolved over time,
and whether it has had any negative consequences for Pakistan both domestically, and
internationally. In the last part, I will take a brief look at the lessons Pakistan should aim to learn
from the first two parts and how it should try to navigate the popular religious sentiment and
fervor in an increasingly complex and volatile political situation.

A. British India until 1947

To understand the concept of nationalism in the Indian context, there must first be a framework.
When referring to ‘Indian nationalism’, I am looking at the modern Indian subcontinent, post
17th Century. During this timeframe, the subcontinent was still divided into numerous smaller
states and they were either already colonized or were in the process of being colonized by the
British (Welch 2011). So, the initial scene here is one of a very fragmented India with one major
factor bringing them together (in terms of governance): colonization. During the British Raj,
there were around 565 ‘princely states’ which were ruled by a local ruler who had complete
autonomy in all departments except defense, foreign affairs, and communication. These three,
along with inter-state relations, were looked after by the government of India led by a Viceroy
appointed by the British government (Khanam 2016). The Viceroys were all of British descent
leading up until the last one, Lord Mountbatten. Towards the end of this timeframe, I will
highlight how Indian nationalism proved to be a pivotal element in mitigating the uproar that
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started when these states were forced to give up their lands and sovereignty. At this point, in
1947, they only had two choices: become a part of either India or Pakistan.

Indian colonization has been covered extensively by countless scholars in different contexts,
with nationalism being one of the major factors studied. While these scholars are not always in
full agreement with one another, one area where there’s some consensus concerns the origins of
this nationalism. Madhusoodanan, in their work which analyzes multiple credible sources, argues
that every major nationalist uprising in British India was a direct result of oppressive policy
changes by the British government. The Indian populace, especially the educated middle class,
considered it unjust that decisions that significantly affected Indians were being made without
any say from the Indians themselves (Madhusoodanan 2009). The lack of representation led to
an ‘us’ versus ‘them’ situation, providing grounds for the Indians to unite and leading to the
evocation of nationalistic sentiments.

The introduction of Western education in the Indian middle class was one of the main factors
leading to a rise of nationalism in the region (McLane 1978). However, it was the creation of the
Indian National Congress in 1885 that brought Indian nationalism into the political arena;
whereas the belief amongst mainstream Muslim politicians that the Congress valued Hindu
interests more than Muslim interests introduced religious divide into the mix. McLane observed
this divide and highlighted that Indian nationalism, especially in the late 19th and early 20th
centuries, was fragmented across religious lines—the main division being the Hindu-Muslim
divide (McLane 1978). To put it in simplistic terms, the Indians wanted independence from the
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British and somewhere along the way, the Muslims decided that not only did they want
independence from the British, they also did not want to live jointly with the Hindus afterwards.

Looking at important nationalist movements in the Indian subcontinent in the early 20th century
makes it evident that the ‘divide and rule’ policies implemented by the British early on during
their rule started backfiring towards the end, giving rise to nationalist sentiments amongst the
people (Sarkar 1989, 20). At the start, it was easy for the British colonizers to exploit the lack of
a single unified ‘nation’ and divide the people based on religious and/or ethnic divisions. A
prime example of this is how they divided the Indian army to ensure security for the British
soldiers, who were far fewer in number. The strategy’s main goal is perfectly summed up in this
quote by Lord Ellenborough: “The fewer elements of combination there are in the native army
the better, and therefore the more nationalities and castes and religions, the more secure we shall
be” (Stewart 1951, 53).

However, over time, it was these same policies combined with certain other factors that gave rise
to Indian nationalism. Although the division of British India into presidencies and provinces was
met with little resistance in the early days of British rule, when Lord Curzon decided to partition
Bengal into two in 1905, the British were met with fierce resistance from the Bengalis. Sarkar
attributes this to the “atmosphere of strong regional unity and growing self-confidence”, a strong
nationalist sentiment that had developed over time during the British rule (Sarkar 1989, 109). As
seen throughout this thesis, multiple similar nationalist movements showed this strong sense of
unity.
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As the timeline moves closer to 1947, divisions arise in scholarly works over the reasons behind
Muhammad Ali Jinnah, leader of the All-India Muslim League, shifting from staunchly
advocating for Hindu-Muslim unity until the 1920s to believing that partition was the only
answer. As is evident, a strong sense of nationalism—the Indians’ resolve that they needed
independence as a nation—was the major motivation for the demand for an independent India,
whereas the divide that led to the partition was along religious lines. Jawaharlal Nehru, the first
Prime Minister of India post-1947 called this religious nationalism inevitable (Bose 1998).
However, while traditional scholars base the partition entirely on religion, the revisionists
question to what extent it was solely religion.

Some in the revisionist pool argue that Jinnah never wanted Pakistan to be a religious or
theocratic state and a leading voice in this regard is Khairi who calls Jinnah a “nationalist of the
highest order” (Khairi 1995, 250). Wolpert from UCLA, in his review of Khairi’s texts, argues
that there is no proof of Jinnah wanting a purely secular state (Wolpert 1995, 1607). Khairi relies
on his access to countless letters written by Jinnah, amongst other primary sources, but reading
his work makes it evident that he was unable to truly separate his journalistic tendencies and
analyze the sources in an unbiased manner (Wolpert 1995, 1608).

For the purposes of this analysis, it is important to understand that while there is disagreement as
to how important a role religion played in the partition, it played an important role, nonetheless.
The divide and rule policies implemented by the British along with controversial acts such as the
partition of Bengal in 1905 were aimed at stripping the Indians of any sense of collective identity
but these arbitrary divisions were not able to combat the Indians’ strong feelings and sense of
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identity associated with their religious beliefs. Leading up to 1947, even though religious
nationalism was on the rise, there are no major examples of violence erupting on the basis of
religion. The Hindus and Muslims had a cordial relationship, even though the latter wanted a
separate state. None of the arguments that critics of religious nationalism have put forth apply
here. The Indians were coexisting despite the differences in their faiths as they believed that both
their national identity (being Indian) and their religious beliefs were equally important.
Moreover, the two men at the forefront of the movement for Indian independence, Gandhi and
Jinnah, believed in the importance of secular politics despite having strong religious beliefs
(Pande 2010). Thus, religious nationalism proved to be very beneficial for the Indians in gaining
independence from the British Raj and it allowed them to free themselves from the oppression
they had faced for centuries.

B. Pakistan post-1947
The literature on nationalism and religion in post-independence Pakistan 6, on the other hand, is
not as abundant as the literature on religious nationalism in British India that I have analyzed so
far. This lack of literature can partly be attributed to the stifling of dissent and narratives that
threaten the integrity of the state—as is evident from multiple studies and reports including those
produced by the Human Rights Watch (HRW 2019). Khan explores how fragmented the
populace is in today’s Pakistan and how these divisions were exacerbated over time. While the
division amongst nationalists came in the form of religion in British India, these divisions
appeared along ethnic lines in Pakistan. From the initial five ethnic groups in Pakistan (West and

6

In this section, references to Pakistan pre-1971 do not include East Pakistan (modern day
Bangladesh) unless otherwise specified.
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East) (i.e. Balochis, Sindhis, Punjabis, Bengalis and Pukhtuns), four actively advocated against
the administrative structure of the state i.e. the way that the country was run through a central
government which had a great deal of control over each of the provinces.

The Pakhtuns and Balochis were opposed to being a part of Pakistan right from the start and
wanted their own independent states, while the Sindhis supported the creation of Pakistan under
the assumption that it would be a decentralized confederation of Muslim majority states. This
assumption proved to be false leading the Sindhis to oppose the administrative structure of the
newly created state (Khan 2005). Of the four groups, the Bengalis managed to separate
themselves and create their own state, Bangladesh, in 1971. Madan makes it a point to mention
that although Islam served as a strong bond, it was not strong enough to overcome these ethnic
divisions (Madan 2009, 24-27).

After the creation of Pakistan, a new ethnic group was created—the Mohajirs. This group
consisted of migrants who had moved from India to Pakistan during the partition. They were
staunch supporters of the state which was to be expected considering they left everything behind
to be a part of this new country. This group too, however, soon lost faith in the administrative
structure of the state and yet another faction of ethnic nationalism was added to the mix (Khan
2005). Instead of exploring this rise of ethnic nationalism in detail, what is more relevant is the
role religion played in all of this. Religion, the institution that served as a divisive force pre1947, now served as a unifying force. These ethnic groups boasted unique cultures, traditions,
languages, and history and the one factor that brought them together was a common religion.
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However, the involvement of religion cannot be considered benign as religious leaders, most of
whom were initially opposed to the creation of Pakistan, started calling for complete Islamization
of the state (Hassan 1985). The liberal politicians of the All-India Muslim League, under the
leadership of Jinnah, were against this but it is clear that their protests were unsuccessful.
Farzana highlights how the true role of religion in the state has never been defined properly.
Instead, the country started going down a path that saw it becoming more Islamized as time
passed, both at the societal and the administrative levels. This Islamization intensified after the
secession of Bangladesh in 1971 as the country turned away from South Asia and started
developing deeper ties with the Muslim Middle East (Shaikh 2009). The thesis will look at this
shift in detail, to trace how religion grew in prominence and to understand whether or not this
had morally good or bad outcomes for the state and/or its populace.

There is a general consensus amongst scholars in this field that religion and nationalism have
been present in Pakistan throughout its history, both being used repeatedly by religious, military
and liberal leaders alike to legitimize their rule and increase their authority and power. More than
70 years after its inception, these institutions are stronger than ever and show no signs of fading
anytime soon (Haqqani 2004; Khan 2005). The same religious nationalism that did not give rise
to any incidents before 1947 that can serve as empirical evidence of the arguments critics of
religious nationalism put forth is now actively leading Pakistan down a dark route.

Before 1947, religious nationalism in the case of Muslims was tied to the belief that the Muslims
should have their own state where they will not be oppressed anymore and where they will be
able to practice their faith with freedom. After Pakistan gained independence, however, the sense
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of superiority and the element of ‘othering’ that nationalism brings with it had already seeped
into society. The newly formed nation-state had an overwhelming Muslim majority but within
this nation, there were sectarian and ethnic divisions. There were different sects of Islam with the
Sunni Muslims being the overwhelming majority while other sects such as the Shias having a
very limited number of followers in comparison.

In terms of ethnicity, the Punjabis had a much greater representation and Punjab was home to the
Pakistan Army, as discussed in Section 3. Therefore, the idea of superiority that was so deeply
ingrained in society by this point simply found a new home. The Sunnis started oppressing those
belonging to other sects of Islam while the Punjabis gave rise to a new phenomenon of ethnic
nationalism. In these cases, it can be easily seen that religious nationalism played a negative role.
However, even in these cases it is nationalism and the idea of superiority it brings with it that led
to this rise in religious and ethnic intolerance. These beliefs about Sunni/Punjabi superiority
could have been dealt with during the early years following 1947 had there been direct political
motivation and desire to do so.

It can be argued that those in power until the late 60s actively resisted and did not give into the
demands of these nationalist groups but there is a clear time period where Pakistan takes a turn
for the worse. This happened on the back of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s use of emotive religious
phrases to gain power by appealing to the religious sentiments of the public. Once in power, his
government started yielding to these nationalist groups, especially following the loss of East
Pakistan in 1971, to ensure that they would be able to stay in power. This set a very dangerous
precedent for years to come—that siding with radical religious nationalist groups results in a
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great increase in one’s support and voter base. Following Bhutto’s tenure, Zia ul Haq used
religion to an even greater extent to legitimize his rule through what he called the Islamization of
Pakistan, which was discussed already in Section 3. From that point onwards, the country has
simply spiraled down and descended into an era of widespread religious intolerance.

What makes the modern-day Pakistani case harder to deal with is the fact that these institutions
of religious and ethnic nationalism do not exist without support. Much akin to the points raised
in the critique of argument 4 in section 3, there is a great deal of support from the public that
reinforces these ideas of superiority and emboldens those who oppress minority groups. This has
hampered the nation’s progress in economic and humanitarian terms and will inevitably lead to
more domestic suffering and the country being completely ostracized on the global stage. A very
recent example of the latter is the action taken by the European Union against Pakistan to
reassess the country’s special trading privileges as part of the GSP plus group in light of its
controversial blasphemy laws (UNPO 2021). This came after weeks of violent protests led by
extremist followers of TLP (Tehreek-e-Labaik Pakistan—an Islamist political party) that led to
countless people being injured and the deaths of two police officers (Janjua 2021). The fact that
the current government was unable to take a heavy-handed approach in stopping these violent
protests goes to show how religious nationalism and fervor is taking a turn for the worse
(Devdiscourse 2021). In cases like this, the underlying elements of nationalism that give rise to
such groups and identities, if left unchecked for too long, can very easily lead to the downfall of
the entire state.
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C. Lessons to learn from the Pakistani case
The single most important takeaway from this analysis of religious nationalism’s evolution in
British India and, later on, post-independence Pakistan, is that nationalism can lead a nation and
its people down an endless cycle of violence and othering. While it is hard to find explicit
evidence of religious nationalism in British India having any of the undesirable characteristics
that scholars criticize it for, the same cannot be said for Pakistan following its independence in
1947. The same group of people that rallied around the desire for religious freedom and
demanded a country where they would not be oppressed, turned into the oppressors themselves.
This shift happened as soon as they went from being a part of the minority i.e. Indian Muslims,
to being Pakistani Muslims, an overwhelming majority. This ties back to the critique of the third
argument from section 3, the fact that ‘othering’ is an integral part of nationalism itself.

It is important to acknowledge that the oppression was carried out on the basis of faith with
Sunni Muslims being the dominant group and those belonging to other faiths, or even other sects
within Islam, being oppressed and marginalized. Nevertheless, this does not mean that religion is
to blame here. The minority group of Muslims that rallied for Pakistan found themselves in a
position, after 1947, where their demands were accepted, and they had achieved their goals. This,
however, left them in a position where the belief that they were a nation that was different from
the others they shared territory with now had no foundation. Pakistan had an overwhelming
Muslim majority, almost everyone residing in the state was Muslim. The religious nationalists
had lost the defining characteristic that set them apart, the characteristic that they derived their
sense of belonging and superiority from. They needed to find an alternative basis to justify their
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strong nationalist sentiments, to pacify their need to view themselves as better than others in the
newly formed state.

This need was fulfilled in two main ways: inter-religious nationalism with the Sunni Muslims at
the forefront and ethnic nationalism with Punjabis at the forefront. Religion and ethnicity served
as means to an end; it just so happens that religion and ethnicity offered them with distinct
delineators to separate themselves from the ‘others’. The cases highlighted in section 3 follow,
for the most part, a similar pattern. The same religious nationalism that championed the desire
for Muslims to have their own homeland quickly degenerated into an institution that inflicted
unbearable pain on religious and ethnic groups that were not Sunni Muslim or Punjabi.

Looking at the progression of religious nationalism in this case, it is clear that radicalization does
not come about as a result of any specific form of nationalism—it is nationalism itself that
radicalizes groups of people by instilling within them the belief that they are superior to those
around them. This belief need not, and in most of the cases presented in this thesis, does not, rely
on any rational foundation. Allowing for nationalisms that threaten the integrity of the state, as
Pakistan has done countless times in its history, simply exacerbates the situation. The case of
Rahul Gandhi from Section 3 demonstrates how trying to meet nationalist groups in the middle
does not work well either—they do not negotiate.

It is important to realize that once they are given a platform and a voice, nationalist groups are
very hard to contain afterward. What justifies the existence of one form of nationalism versus
another is entirely context and perspective dependent. There is no clear answer to this question.
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The presence of concerning patterns within nationalist groups, however, can be seen from the
very early stages. If a state wishes to maintain its integrity and effectively combat these negative
effects of nationalism, it is imperative to not give any concessions to groups that exhibit the
negative characteristics explicated in this thesis. As far as the question of understanding what
form of nationalism is justified and should be allowed to exist within a state is concerned, that is
outside the scope of this thesis and would be a logical next step for anyone wishing to continue
this analysis.
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